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Abstract
Title of Dissertation: A safety analysis on the potential risks onboard ships that would
use ammonia as marine fuel.
The shipping industry has to address and achieve, the GHG emission reduction targets
as set out in the IMO’s strategy for reducing GHG emissions and eventually phasing
out as soon as possible. The decarbonisation of maritime transportation has apparently,
no single pathway towards attaining a ‘zero carbon’ fuel at this stage. Various research
projects are currently underway, to identify the most suitable alternate fuel considering
all aspects including namely, the cost, scalability, availability, safety, performance,
etc.
This research is an attempt to understand and acquire a wider perspective on the
matters of safety and risks, pertinent to ships that select ammonia as the alternate
marine fuel. The industrial accidents that have occurred in the sectors such as food
processing, chemicals and fertilizers etc. have provided some insights into the potential
hazards posed by ammonia and have been used in this research as case-study.
Acknowledging the fact that the uptake of ammonia as a marine fuel will be hugely
dependent on the safety performance of the ships that would be the initial movers
during this transition period, the researcher engaged with experts from the shipping
industry to understand the risk profile and the mitigation measures considered prudent
and necessary.
This research also attempts to identify the existing gaps in the current regulatory
framework at a time, when the shipping regulators and the industry are still in the
process of creating overarching guidelines for ship’s use of ammonia as a marine fuel.
The research outcomes are demonstrated with the aid of two diagrams namely, a
fishbone diagram showing the cause and effect of an ammonia accident and a bow tie
diagram incorporating the identified safety barriers in the concluding chapter of this
research.
Keywords: Risk assessment, safety analysis, hazard identification, toxicity,
corrosivity, pollution, safety barrier
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background
Albert Einstein once said, "There are only two ways to live your life. One is as though
nothing is a miracle. The other is as though everything is" (Sessions, 2005). The world
has acknowledged albeit lately, that the planet earth is warming. The recent statement
by the World Health Organization (WHO), Director for Europe (WHO, 2022) on the
record-breaking high temperatures and heat wave conditions that prevailed across
Europe during the summer of 2022, quoted adjectives from news reports such as
“Unprecedented”, “Frightening” and “Apocalyptic” to sum up the disastrous outcomes
of climate change.
Historically, the rise in temperatures has been attributed to the increase in human
activities and the corresponding increase in the concentration of the Greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions to the atmosphere (Khandekar et al., 2005). In 2015, at the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), an international
agreement was adopted which is popularly known as “The Paris Agreement”. This
Conference of Parties (CoP) attended by 196 parties set its goal to limit global warming
to well below 2, preferably to 1.5 degrees Celsius, compared to pre-industrial levels
(UNFCC, 2015). Although international shipping was not included in the Paris
Agreement, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), as the industry's
regulating authority, has been active in its efforts to decrease greenhouse gas emissions
from ships.
Global warming has been a serious concern and with its ever-growing visible impacts
to both, nature and human lives, the shipping industry which contributes 2.89 % of the
global anthropogenic emission (IMO, 2021), has a serious course correction on hand.
In solidarity with the United Nation’s global fight against climate change and in
support of the UN Sustainable Development Goal 13, the IMO had amended the
‘International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships’ (MARPOL)
requiring ships, to combine a technical and an operational approach to reduce their
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carbon intensity. The maritime industry had been exploring the use of alternate fuels
against the now dominant fossil fuels in its efforts to meet the reduction in the levels
of Nitrogen Oxide, Sulphur and Greenhouse gases as emission from the ship’s exhaust.
These changes are being undertaken, both on existing ships as retrofits and in
newbuilding (DNV, 2021a).
The initial IMO strategy towards reducing the GHG emissions from ships adopted in
April 2018 (IMO, 2019) has set ambitious targets for the maritime industry to adopt,
with the ultimate aim of phasing out the GHG emissions from maritime transportation.
The IMO has set targets of achieving 50% reduction in GHG emissions from ships on
international voyages by 2050 and reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 70%
by the year 2030, compared to the 2008 level. To meet the ambition set out in the
initial IMO GHG policy, zero-emission vessels must enter the fleet by 2030 and make
up a significant share of newbuilds thereafter. It is critical that zero-carbon solutions
are not only commercially viable, but also technically possible and can be
implemented and run securely (Lloyd’s Register and UMAS, 2019). There are serious
deliberations and research on the suitability and wider acceptability of a variety of
fuels; and as a first step, hybridization of the existing ships is also a viable transitionary
process and has the potential to provide a baseline which will lead towards a zeroemission configuration for newer designs (Reusser & Perez Osses, 2021).
The use of gaseous fuels such as Liquified Natural Gas (LNG), Liquified Petroleum
Gas (LPG), Ammonia, Hydrogen raises the hazard level especially on the non-tanker
ships, which earlier had very limited risk exposure in relation to the fuel onboard. The
International Code of Safety for ships using gas or other low flashpoint fuels (IGF
Code) was developed by IMO (IMO, 2015) to provide an international standard for
ships, using low flash-point fuels other than those ships covered by the International
Code of the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk
(IGC Code). The toxicity and other hazards associated with most of these alternate
fuels, require development of new safety standards (McCarney, 2020) as the current
IGF Code focuses only on regulations to meet the functional requirements for LNG as
fuel and is silent on other prospective fuels. Until such regulations are in place,
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approval of ships using fuels other than LNG will be based on alternative design
approach, demonstrating that the design complies with the functional requirements of
the IGF Code. This risk-based approval process is referred to as the ‘alternative design’
approach (part A sec. 2.3 in the IGF code), where an equivalent level of safety needs
to be demonstrated as specified in SOLAS regulation II-1/55 and approved by the
Administration.
Ammonia is an alternate fuel candidate that has the potential to emerge as one of the
future alternate fuel options for the shipping industry. Ammonia can easily be liquefied
by increasing the pressure to 10 bar at room temperature or cooling to -33 degrees
Celsius at atmospheric pressure (MacFarlane et al., 2020). The availability of
appropriate production and distribution facilities, as well as adequate bunkering
infrastructure, are all prerequisites for launching a new fuel. Ammonia has the
potential to have a huge influence in the next decades by enabling the shift away from
our worldwide reliance on fossil fuels and contributing significantly to the reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions.

1.2 Problem Statement
A majority of the alternate fuels under consideration, necessitate considerable onboard modifications and, therefore, designing a traditional system may not only be
difficult but also have cost implications. Although ships have been carrying chemicals
such as ammonia as cargo on liquefied gas tankers, there exist huge technical
differences in the ships that are being built with the provision of ammonia as marine
fuel. Most of the technical differences pose distinct safety challenges which need to be
mitigated for ammonia to be considered as a safe fuel onboard.
Finding economical and effective answers to all of these difficulties, as well as
establishing technical feasibility, developing suitable legislation, and putting in place
safety procedures, will be critical in allowing more flexible routes to a low-carbon
energy future on a global scale.
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1.3 Aims and objectives of this research
The machinery space of a significant number of newer ships is set for a change, not
only in layout but also additional equipment that may have to be fitted, based on the
chosen energy conversion methods viz., Internal Combustion (IC) Engine, Fuel cell,
battery, etc.
This research aims to assimilate the potential hazards associated with the use of
ammonia as marine fuel onboard ships and assess the adequacy of the barriers in place,
to control and mitigate those identified hazards. In the historical perspective, ammonia
has been used for industrial purposes, and the knowledge of production, storage,
transportation and usage is well documented. The research aims to study the available
data on industrial accidents involving ammonia and critically assess the same in the
shipping context.
Objectives of the Research
The research comprises of the following objectives:
1. To identify potential hazards that would be posed by the use of ammonia as
marine fuel onboard ships; and
2. To examine efficacy of the safety standards currently being employed in the
design and construction of ships that would use ammonia as marine fuel, in the
interim hiatus period of non-existent uniform, international regulations.

1.4 Research questions
The researcher proposes the following research questions to meet the aim and
objectives of this research:
1. What would be the causal factors of potential accidents onboard a ship
designed to operate on ammonia as fuel?
2. What control measures would be required to be employed, to ensure safety of
ship and personnel onboard, protection of marine environment and safe
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shipboard operation and maintenance activities when ships use ammonia as
marine fuel?

1.5 Structure of this dissertation
This introductory chapter provided a brief background on the trajectory of the
international bodies in the pursuit of achieving elimination of the GHG emissions
within the targeted period.

Further, an insight was provided on the maritime

decarbonization scenario and the specific challenges it gives rise to. The remainder of
the dissertation is structured under five chapters as follows.
Chapter 2 examines maritime decarbonization and risk mitigation. The chapter
commences with a background on the use of ammonia in other allied industries over
the past years and provides an update on the data about the ships on order with various
alternate fuel options. The researcher discusses the concept of hazard identification,
risk assessment and safety analysis with thrust on the chemical processing industry
acknowledging the marked hazards of ammonia which are dealt in the subsequent
chapters.
Chapter 3 examines material safety data on Ammonia. The chapter introduces the
standards governing the design of any ‘Safety Data Sheet’ and discusses the important
sections such as physical and chemical properties, health and environment hazards,
etc. The variance in the standards especially those concerning the exposure threshold
and flammability limits are explored and tabulated.
Chapter 4 discusses the research methodology. The chapter explains the methodology
employed in this research, and introduces the data collection technique, data analysis
methods used in the research.
Chapter 5 examines the results and analysis. The chapter assimilates the data collected
and starts with analysis of the industrial accident data to understand the underlying
risks. The qualitative data acquired by way of interview with the experts in the
decarbonization field, were analysed by selecting the themes and categorising them
into broad groupings.
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Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation with a discussion on the interpretation of the
results and recommendations. The cause and effect of an accident is presented using
a fishbone diagram and the safety barriers to prevent one, is demonstrated using a bowtie diagram. The outcome of the research and the scope for future research are
discussed in the concluding part of this chapter.
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Chapter 2: Maritime Decarbonization and Risk Mitigation
2.1 Maritime decarbonization at crossroads
The transition to zero carbon fuels for the maritime industry is challenging and diverse
with no single pathway to decarbonization, as yet. This is inevitable, as different
sectors and regions of the world are expected to adopt the decarbonization pathway
best suited for them based on the prevailing policy of the respective government(s),
and shall surely be influenced by the developments that are taking shape around the
world. Historically, the maritime sector has been connecting allied sectors and regions
of the world, providing uninterrupted supply of the required product and has always
played the role of an enabler. The improvements in technology and the manner in
which other sectors prepare and finally make the transition to alternate fuels, shall have
a bearing on the shipping industry as well (Müller-Casseres et al., 2021).
The Hellenic Shipping News network (2022) has reported that a record 268 alternate
fuelled ships have been ordered in the first half of 2022; out of which 174 ships were
non-LNG tanker ships. The remainder of the ships ‘on order’ include 66 ships that
will be built on the “ammonia ready” concept and 3 ships on the “hydrogen ready”
concept. These types of ships are expected to be initially fuelled by either LNG or
other such fuels and shall be upgradeable to use ammonia as fuel, at a later stage as the
technology develops and ammonia becomes widely available.
Although, cost and GHG savings are fundamental enablers for the fuel uptake, there
are other aspects such as safety regulations, technical maturity, operators’ expertise,
etc. which still have to be analysed to allay safety concerns, especially for zero carbon
fuel options such as ammonia and hydrogen (Prussi et al., 2021). The most challenging
task is to account for all potential failure modes of a system during development and
to ensure safe operation under all circumstances (Bozzano et al., 2003).
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2.2 Hazard recognition and safety analysis
2.2.1 Recognizing the hazards and the process of risk assessment
An effective safety management (Namian et al., 2018) is fundamentally dependent on
the twin factors of hazard recognition and safety risk perception. The state of being
considered as ‘safe’ is often described as the absence of adverse outcomes (accidents,
incidents, personal injuries, work loss days, etc.), or more formally as a state in which
the risk of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or
below, an acceptable level (Hollnagel, 2008). This safe state is achieved through a
continuing process of hazard identification and risk management.
According to Macdonald (2004), a hazard is ‘an inherent physical or chemical
characteristic that has the potential for causing harm to people, property or the
environment.’
The national chemicals control guidance published by Swedish Chemicals Agency
(2020) defines risk as the probability of an adverse outcome.
Risk = Frequency x Consequence of a hazard.
When dealing with the risk assessment of chemicals, the nature of the adverse outcome
depends on the intrinsic property of the chemical and the susceptibility of the target
organism, while the probability also depends on the degree of exposure to the
chemical.
A risk is perceived to be large if the probability of an event is high, or if the loss is
severe or both together and vice-versa (Hollnagel, 2008). The ability to identify not
only the events that might lead to an adverse outcome, but also the outcome forms the
prerequisite for ensuring safety at all times. In fact, this is what risk assessment is all
about, and over the years numerous methodologies and techniques have been
developed to make this process more reliable and efficient.
An effective risk assessment should comprise of three steps (Adamski & Westrum,
2003):
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(a) Recognize the nature of the problem or even to acknowledge that there exists
a problem.
(b) Recognize the “mechanisms” or the potential paths which may lead to an
adverse outcome, to foresee the consequences, and to distinguish whether the
risk posed is small or large.
(c) Consider or identify strategies that can be employed to either lessen or
completely eliminate the risk or to safeguard against the outcomes. If any of
these stages don’t work, the risk might not be identified until an adverse
outcome, by which point its usually too late to take any action.
According to Hendershot (2011), the chemical industry employs inherently safe design
(ISD) philosophy for addressing safety issues in the design and operation of facilities
that use or process hazardous chemicals. However, when one considers the multiple
risks associated with any technology, including chemical processing, it is unlikely that
any process or plant design can eliminate all hazards and risk. A combination of ISD,
engineering and administrative controls will always be required to adequately manage
all process risks.
2.2.2 Significance of a safety analysis
Safety analysis can be defined (Harms-Ringdahl, 2013) as a procedure for analysing
systems in order to identify and evaluate hazards and safety characteristics. It includes
quantitative and qualitative risk analysis, accident investigations, and also some other
applications. It can be used to:
 Support efficient accident prevention;
 Contribute to an understanding of how accidents can occur at the specific
workplace under examination;
 Increase awareness and communication; and
 Demonstrate systematic safety work.
Pidgeon (1998) had advocated integration of safety risk perceptions while making
policies, as perceptions lead to actions with real consequences. The manner in which
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any worker perceives a risk in their daily activities would have an effect on their
performance and, therefore, this factor should be taken into account when making riskrelated decisions. The safety evaluation by the ship crew is, therefore, perceived to be
an important aspect to ensure shipboard safety (Fenstad et al., 2016).
In addition to the several design requirements identified, any risk elimination or risk
reduction process should, therefore, have supplemental requirements such as safety
warning devices, personnel training and safe maintenance procedures for further
minimizing the safety risk of hazard. The process required to eliminate or control
safety risk by the order of hazard precedence as designed by Alberico et al (1999) is
presented in the figure 1.

Figure 1: Hazard reduction diagram in the order of precedence
Source: (Alberico et al., 1999)
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2.3 Ammonia - a marine fuel option
Ammonia has been known primarily for its use in the agricultural sector and had been
produced for over 100 years. As compared to the global production of approximately
300 million tonnes of LPG, approximately 175 million tonnes of ammonia are
produced annually worldwide. Most of this ammonia is used in the production of
fertilizers, with small amounts going into the production of explosives, chemicals and
materials (MacFarlane et al., 2020). Ammonia is also employed as refrigerant in large
scale industrial coolers and as a raw material for a variety of industrial goods.
Ammonia is a chemical additive used in the thermal power generation sector for
Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) of Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) and, therefore, most
large thermal power plants have ammonia tanks (Kobayashi, Hayakawa, Somarathne
et al., 2019).
The world is also exploring chemical energy storage in the form of carbon free fuels
such as hydrogen to meet the decarbonization demands of the various industrial
sectors. The renewable sources such as wind energy and solar power are intermittent
and requires storage of the energy in batteries or in chemical form in order to cushion
the effects of fluctuation in energy production (Kobayashi, Hayakawa, Somarathne et
al., 2019). Ammonia is also looked upon as one of the options as a hydrogen carrier
(Rouwenhorst et al., 2020).
An Ammonia (NH3) molecule contains 17.6 wt.% hydrogen and contains no carbon.
It can be readily decomposed to a gas mixture of 75% H2 and 25% N2, offering a high
output and clean hydrogen generation with zero carbon emission (Wan et al., 2021).
Ammonia on combustion produces primarily water and nitrogen. The substitution of
ammonia for fossil fuels will therefore reduce carbon dioxide emissions significantly.
Ammonia is differentiated based on how it is produced (Ash & Scarbrough, 2019).
Brown ammonia is made using coal gasification, whereas grey ammonia sources the
hydrogen from natural gas reforming. Blue ammonia is brown ammonia with carbon
capture and storage technology applied to the manufacturing process and green
ammonia is made entirely from electricity, water and air; the hydrogen for its synthesis
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is generated from electrolyser stacks. Green ammonia is not widely produced
currently, but holds promise in the sustainability scenario.

2.4 Safety challenges in use of Ammonia as a marine fuel
There are several key barriers to ammonia’s wide adoption as a marine fuel
(Mallouppas et al., 2022). These include:
(a)

high production costs, due to the high capital costs associated with
ammonia’s supply chain;

(b)

availability, specifically the limited geographical locations available for
ammonia bunkering;

(c)

the challenge of ramping up current ammonia production; and

(d)

the development of ammonia-specific regulations addressing issues
such as toxicity, safety, and storage.

A ship that would use zero carbon fuel such as ammonia (ABS, 2021) and hydrogen
(Bicer & Dincer, 2018) would have to be extremely cautious in the handling of the fuel
and the containment/ preparation system due to its unique characteristics. The
flammability, corrosivity and the level of toxicity of alternate fuels such as ammonia
differ from the conventional fuel and is a safety challenge (Kim et al., 2020).
The industrial use of ammonia as refrigerant, chemicals and fertilizer had resulted in
numerous accidents, some of which have been serious with fatalities (OSHA, 2022)
(Technical Safety, 2022). A detailed analysis of these accidents provided in the
subsequent chapters of this research, provided some significant insights on the hazards
posed by ammonia and the mitigation measures that would be required for elimination
of the risks.

2.5 Conclusion
The IGC Code regulation 16.9.2 prohibits liquefied gas carriers carrying ammonia to
use ammonia as fuel due to its toxicity. The Part A of the IGF Code requires the ships
other than liquefied gas carriers intending to use ammonia as fuel, to adopt an
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alternative design methodology in consultation with the flag administration so as to
define the approval process in accordance with the conditions prescribed for
installation of machinery, electrical system, fuel storage and distribution systems. The
IGF Code, further requires a risk assessment to be undertaken so as to identify possible
risks and consider the safety mitigating measures that may need to be implemented
during design and operational procedures. In addition to the design of the vessel,
specific risks such as bunkering, port operations etc. shall need to be further assessed
with the concerned stakeholders.
In order to assess the risk and identify measures to mitigate them, it is vital to
understand the physical, chemical and thermodynamic properties of ammonia and the
hazards posed by them. The subsequent chapter dwells into these and highlights the
inconsistency that exists in the standards applied across the different regions of the
world.
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Chapter 3: Ammonia: Material Safety Data
3.1 Background
In 1992, the UN Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED)
recommended a globally harmonized system of classification and labelling of
chemicals, including safety data sheets as one of the six areas for action on
environmentally sound management of toxic chemicals (UNCED, 1992). The Globally
Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS) was
developed and issued by the United Nations (UN) in 2003 (Ronald, 2012). GHS
regulates the hazard-based labelling and classification of chemicals, and provides the
basis for a worldwide harmonization of rules and regulations on chemicals.
GHS was aimed at enhancing the protection of human health and the environment
during their handling, transport and use, by ensuring that the information about their
physical, health and environmental hazards are available. Further, the United Nations
(2007) issued a guidance on the preparation of a Safety Data Sheet (SDS) as an annex
to the GHS in the year 2007 with the intention of having a uniform harmonized system,
worldwide. This further led to the conduct of a systemic review of the existing standard
ISO 11014-1:1994 by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the
development of the revised international standard ISO 11014:2009 by aligning the
predecessor text with the GHS as regards hazard communication (ISO, 2009). The
ISO’s objective of this International Standard was to create consistency in providing
information on safety, health and environmental matters for chemical products.
SDS’s are viewed as an important element of hazard communication in the GHS. The
GHS guidelines and the ISO 11014:2009, require the information in the SDS to be
presented using the sixteen headings in the order specified in figure 2.
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Figure 2: Schematic representation of 16 sections of the Safety data sheet

3.2 Physical and Chemical properties of ammonia
The Safety Data Sheet for ammonia that are being issued by product suppliers
worldwide, largely follow the format described above and the particulars are
listed in table 1.
Table 1. Physical and chemical properties of ammonia

Identification
Product name

: Ammonia, anhydrous

Chemical formula

: NH3

CAS. No

: 7664-41-7

UN-Number, IMDG, IATA

: UN 1005

EC No.

: 231-635-3
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Physical and Chemical Properties
Physical state:

:

Gas

Form:

:

Liquefied gas

Colour:

:

Colourless

Odour:

:

Pungent suffocating odour

pH:

:

Melting Point:

:

-77.7 °C

Boiling Point:

:

-33 °C

Critical Temp. (°C):

:

132.0 °C

Flash Point:

:

Not applicable to gases and gas mixtures.

Flammability (solid, gas)

:

Flammable gas

Flammability limit - upper (%):

:

25 ~28 %

Flammability limit - lower (%):

:

15~16 %

Vapour pressure:

:

Vapour density (air=1)

:

0.59 AIR=1

Relative density:

:

0.8

Solubility in Water:

:

531 g/l (20 °C)

:

<1

Autoignition Temperature:

:

651 °C Experimental result, Key study

Decomposition Temperature:

:

> 450 °C

Dynamic viscosity:

:

0.7 mPa.s (48.9 °C)

Molecular weight:

:

17.03 g/mol (NH3)

10.6 - 11.6 (0.02-1.7% aqueous ammonia
solution)

8.5737 bar (20 °C) Experimental result,
Key study

Partition coefficient
(n-octanol/water):
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Ammonia is a flammable gas with a low flame speed (0.07 m/s), low flame
temperature and is hard to ignite. The flammability limits are LFL = 14% vol and
UFL = 32.5% vol at 25 °C (Europe - Chemsafe) or LFL = 15% vol and UFL = 28%
vol at 20 °C (USA – NFPA) (Tan et al., 2020). The minimum ignition energy is
generally estimated to be in the range of 12 ~ 50 MJ. Flashpoint as a physical property
is applied only to material in liquid phase and, therefore, the flashpoint of ammonia
has not been consistently identified in relevant publications such as the Safety Data
Sheet (Japan et al., 2021). Such properties together with the possible dependence of
the flashpoint on the method used to determine it (e.g., ISO 1523, ISO 2719, ISO 2592,
ISO 3679, ISO 13736) have introduced uncertainty in determining the flashpoint of
ammonia (reported with different values between 11°C and 650°C); but being a
combustible gas at standard conditions, most of the methods and definitions for
flashpoint are not applicable (International Association of Classification Societies
(IACS), 2022).
The IMO has defined

Low-flashpoint fuel as “gaseous or liquid fuel having a

flashpoint lower than otherwise permitted under paragraph 2.1.1 of SOLAS regulation
II-2/4.”
Irrespective of the above, the IACS had vide paper submitted to the Maritime Safety
Committee (MSC) (MSC 105/2/2) proposed that
“While it is a consolidated knowledge that ammonia may create explosive
atmosphere when its concentration in the air is between 15% (LEL) and 28%
(UEL), regardless of the definition of low flashpoint fuel given in the SOLAS
regulation II-1/2.30, precautions should be taken in respect of the possible
formation of both toxic and explosive atmosphere for its safe use as a fuel.”

3.3 Hazards associated with ammonia
Ammonia has a history of being used in various sectors worldwide and, therefore, there
is ample understanding of the physical dangers, health and environmental hazard it
poses.
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3.3.1 Physical dangers
Ammonia gas is a flammable gas, lighter than air. However, under certain conditions,
when compressed liquified ammonia gas initially escapes and comes into contact with
moisture in the air, it tends to form an ammonia fog (CDC, 2011). These dense aerosol
clouds caused due to the flashing phenomenon is likely to remain low to the ground,
and could prevent ammonia gas from rising in the air. There exists a risk of these
clouds getting transported by the winds to a populated area (Crolius et al., 2020).
Dangerous concentrations of ammonia gas will occur quickly in enclosed or poorly
ventilated spaces.
3.3.2 Health Hazards
According to the Classification, Labelling and Packaging Regulation of the European
Union (Ash & Scarbrough, 2019), ammonia is classified as having an acute toxicity
rating of 3 (with 1 being the highest level of danger). It is corrosive and hazardous
when inhaled. This corrosive effect can result in acute eye injury, severe skin burns,
and damage the respiratory tract. There is risk of frostbite or freezing of the skin on
account of any contact with evaporating liquid, in the event of a leak.
The ammonia that has been in use in the various industries as fertilizers, refrigerants
etc. have clearly defined safety procedures to prevent any exposure. For instance, the
stipulated ammonia exposure limits at workplace (WEL) in the United Kingdom (HSE,
2018) are at table 2.
Table 2. UK HSE workplace exposure limits for Ammonia

LTEL (8 hours reference STEL
period)

WEL

(15-minutes

reference

period)

ppm

mg/m3

ppm

mg/m3

25 ppm

18 mg/m3

35 ppm

25 mg/m3

LTEL: Long Term Exposure Limit

STEL: Short Term Exposure Limit
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Areas where workers are regularly carrying out activities need to be monitored to
ensure that these limits are not exceeded. The immediately dangerous to life and health
(IDLH) level for ammonia is 300 ppm (CDC, 2011), which is substantially lower than
the lower explosive limit (150,000 ppm). However, its odour can be detected by
humans at concentrations below 1.5 ppm (Ash & Scarbrough, 2019), significantly
lower than concentrations that produce eye, nose or throat irritation.
The protection of employees from hazardous chemicals has long been acknowledged
by the International Labour Organization (ILO), as key to maintaining health of the
personnel employed and sustainable landscapes. However, employees are still
disproportionately exposed to chemicals in practically every industry (ILO, 2021). The
occupational exposure limits for ammonia derived from the International Chemical
Safety Card (ICSC) which was prepared by an international group of experts on behalf
of ILO (ILO, 2013) and the WHO, with financial assistance of the European
Commission are at table 3.
Table 3. ILO occupational exposure limits for ammonia

Threshold Limit Value (TLV)

EU-Occupational Exposure Limits

TWA

25 ppm

20 ppm

14 mg/m3

STEL

35 ppm

50 ppm

36 mg/m3

The Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) was formed in 1970 in
the United States of America (USA). The National Institute of Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH) was later created in the year 1970. The NIOSH issued the first
Toxic Substances List in 1971, followed by publishing of the IDLH values in 1974. In
the USA, the professional organizations had predated the formation of the
governmental bodies; with the effect that governmental bodies such as the OSHA have
not been able to update the exposure limits of the hazardous chemicals unlike
organizations such as the NIOSH and the American Conference of Governmental
Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) (Bobst, 2017). A comparison of their respective
standards is presented at table 4.

19

Table 4. Comparison of TWA and STEL of NIOSH, OSHA and ACGIH
NIOSH - REL

OSHA - PEL

25 ppm

50 ppm
18 mg/m3

TWA
(10 hours)

25 ppm
35 mg/m3

(8 hours)

35 ppm

35 ppm
3

27 mg/m
(15 minutes)

17 mg/m3
(8 hours)

35 ppm
3

STEL

ACGIH - TLV

24 mg/m3

27 mg/m
(15 minutes)

(15 minutes)

The Safety Data sheet issued by the product supplier in the USA consists all of the
above-mentioned standards for the exposure limits related to ammonia as mandated by
the OSHA (2014). The exposure limits prescribed in the SDSs issued, varies according
to the legislation of the receiving State (Crolius et al., 2020) and is an area of concern.
These thresholds are an important factor to appropriately design the emergency plans
and may prove detrimental in case of a sudden release or an accident (Crolius et al.,
2020).
The acute guidance values are intended to give decision support during planning,
preparedness and response on potential human health consequences of chemical
releases (Öberg et al., 2010).
The two internationally most frequently used guidance values are the Acute Exposure
Guideline Levels (AEGL), developed by the U.S. National Advisory Committee for
the Development of Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Hazardous Substances
(AEGL Committee) and the Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG)
developed by the Emergency Response Planning Committee of the American
Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA). The AEGL and the ERPG systems are similar
in that they have three comparable threshold levels (Tiers). Thus, inhalable exposure
above the Tier 1 level causes slight, reversible effects such as discomfort and/or
irritation. When the exposure exceeds Tier 2 the health effects are disabling. The
effects may be non-reversible and/or impair the ability to escape but they are still nonfatal. Exposure above Tier 3 is deemed to be life threatening or fatal.
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The ERP guidelines were issued to aid Emergency Response and to evaluate possible
health effects to the public or emergency response personnel. The maximum values of
ammonia that can be exposed in the three tiers of the Emergency Response Planning
Guideline (ERPG) are at table 5.
Table 5. Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) values

Source: (Crolius et al., 2020)
AEGLs represent threshold exposure limits (EPA, 2008) for the general public and are
applicable to emergency exposure periods ranging from 10 minutes (min) to 8 hours
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(h). The three levels viz. AEGL-1, AEGL-2, and AEGL-3 were created for five
different exposure durations (10 min, 30 min, 1 h, 4 h, and 8 h) and have varying levels
of the severity of the toxicity effects. The three AEGLs are defined as follows: AEGL1 is the airborne concentration (expressed as parts per million [ppm] or milligrams per
cubic meter [mg/m3]) of a substance above which it is predicted that the general
population, including susceptible individuals, could experience notable discomfort,
irritation, or certain asymptomatic non-sensory effects. However, the effects are not
disabling and are transient and reversible upon cessation of exposure. AEGL-2 is the
airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a substance above which it is
predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could
experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects or an
impaired ability to escape. AEGL-3 is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm
or mg/m3) of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population,
including susceptible individuals, could experience life-threatening health effects or
death. The AEGL levels and the maximum ammonia concentration levels for the
different time duration are specified at table 6 and conceptualised by the author in
figure 3.
Table 6. Threshold ammonia exposure limits at AEGL 1, 2 and 3 vis-à-vis different time
durations
Ammonia concentration (ppm)
10 min

30 min

60 min

4 hrs

8 hrs

AEGL-1

30

30

30

30

30

AEGL-2

220

220

160

110

110

AEGL-3

2700

1600

1100

550

390
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Figure 3: Threshold levels diagram conceptualized by the author based on Acute Exposure
Guideline Levels (AEGL)

3.3.3 Environmental hazards
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (EPA, 2022) have
concluded that based on the nitrogen content, ammonia has two forms: the ionized
form (ammonium, NH4+) and the un-ionized form (ammonia, NH3). An increase in pH
favours formation of the more toxic, un-ionized form (NH3), while a decrease favours
the ionized (NH4+) form. Temperature also affects the toxicity of ammonia to aquatic
life.
Research by the EPA has showed that ammonia is a common cause for fish kills.
However, the most common problems associated with ammonia relate to elevated
concentrations affecting fish growth, gill condition, organ weights and haematocrit
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(Milne et al., 2000). Exposure duration and frequency strongly influence the severity
of effects (Milne et al., 2000). These chronic hazards posed by ammonia to the aquatic
environment have long lasting effects (Ayvali et al., 2021).

3.4 Conclusion
Currently there is no single, acute guidance values for the exposure limits of ammonia,
globally. There have been individual attempts by various nations which are
comparable but not consistent. This poses practical difficulties in evaluating and
benchmarking a common standard that shall be acceptable across the world. This lack
of harmonization has the potential to affect the risk management and communication
amongst the stakeholders in the event of any accident or may prove to be a stumbling
block for an international collaboration. The variance in exposure limit stipulation may
also have a bearing on the adoption of a common standard for the personal protective
equipment and other such emergency equipment.
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology
4.1 Introduction
Research methodology is the structured approach adopted by the researcher in order
to find answers to the research questions, assimilating useful information in the
process. The basic methodology used are qualitative, quantitative or a mixed method
(Goundar, 2012). In this chapter, the methodology employed in this research is
described, followed by other key elements viz., data gathering techniques, data
analysis, ethical consideration, choice of participants, and the limitation of this
research.

4.2 Methodology and design
The research method used in this research is qualitative research methodology. It can
be classified as exploratory from the research objective viewpoint as there was very
limited data available on the subject at the time of writing this dissertation.
A qualitative research approach relies on observations, informal interviews, and the
researcher’s own experience of events and processes (Rossman & Rallis, 2016).
According to Jones (1995) qualitative research begins by accepting that there is a range
of different ways of making sense of the world and is concerned with discovering the
meanings seen by those who are being researched and with understanding their view
of the world rather than that of the researchers.
In most qualitative studies, the researcher is the primary instrument for data collection
and data analysis (Merriam, 2002). Although the qualitative method is generally
undertaken using a relatively small but focused sample base, data collection can be
rather time consuming.
This study was conducted in two parts:
(a)

Firstly, accident data obtained from industrial accidents database were
analysed as case study for understanding the causal factors of such accidents
involving ammonia.
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(b)

Secondly, exploratory interviews were undertaken with the participation of
experts that included members representing the shipping regulators, flag
States, shipping industry associations, classification societies, and other
important stakeholders who have been involved in the risk assessment, hazard
identification (HAZID) and such studies for projects that not only include
ships but other ancillary shore infrastructure such as bunkering facilities,
ports etc.

Overall, figure 4 presents the author’s conceptualisation of the research methodology.

Figure 4: The Research Ladder (as conceptualized by the author)
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4.3 Data gathering techniques
The data collection methods employed in this research include the following:
(a) Industrial accidents data involving ammonia as case study: collection of data on
industrial accidents involving ammonia from authentic sources viz., US
Department of Labour, OSHA (https://www.osha.gov/) and an independent, selffunded

organization

‘Technical

Safety

BC,

Canada’

(https://www.technicalsafetybc.ca/case-study-ammonia-release-incidents-20072017) which has been involved in overseeing safe installation and operation of
technical systems, risks assessment studies, education, and research;
(b) Document review: collection of documented materials such as Material Safety
Data Sheets, Classification Rules and Guidelines issued on the subject of ammonia
as marine fuel;
(c) Semi-Structured interview. Qualitative researchers usually employ “semistructured” interviews which involve a number of open-ended questions based on
the topic areas that the researcher wants to cover (Hancock et al., 2001). The
interview is a unique method of data collection as it involves a direct face-to-face
interaction. The interview provides the researcher with an opportunity to follow
up on the verbal leads and thus achieve higher degree of success in data collection
and greater clarity. A semi-structured interview enables exploratory discussion
that help the researcher to understand the what and the how but also to grasp and
explore the internal dynamics of the research topic (Annan, 2019).
The interviews were scheduled after the participants were provided with a set of
initial questions on the subject. The interviews of the participants were conducted
during the period July 20, 2022 till August 31, 2022 on the remote mode.

4.4 Choice of participants for the research
The participants for the interview, forming part of the qualitative method of data
collection were chosen based on their expertise in the field of maritime
decarbonization with the aim to establish a purposive sample. The participants have
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been working in different capacities as subject matter experts or specialists within their
respective organization’s as well as in other industry coalitions for the risk assessment
studies and development of guidelines for ships that would use ammonia as a marine
fuel. Few of the experts also have the exposure of working with the equipment
manufacturers which include the risk assessment at the design and trial stage.

4.5 Data analysis
Data analysis is the most vital aspect of any research. The approach to data analysis
essentially includes, organizing the collected data, reading and coding them,
organizing the themes and interpreting the data (Cypress, 2018).
The data collected from the industrial accidents involving ammonia were analysed
using the ‘Root Cause Analysis’ methodology and causes identified during the review
of the data were assigned to three main categories, namely,
(a) Human factor
This includes four themes related to deficient safety awareness, deviation
from safe working practices, lack of knowledge and human error.
(b) Management factor
This includes causes attributable to ineffective maintenance, lack of or
ineffective supervision, ineffective or lack of adequate training and nonadherence to standard operating procedures (S0P).
(c) Technical factor
This includes technical causes such as mechanical defects, lack of adequate
protection to critical machines, lack of physical barriers in potentially
hazardous areas and failure to the automation and control system.
The findings were interpreted using the ‘Fishbone diagram’ which provides a visual
interpretation of how the different facets of the problem interact and helps in
identifying the cause-and-effect relationship.
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The interview data were analysed using content analysis and manual coding. The data
was divided into select categories and each was assigned the most appropriate theme
derived from the data.

4.6 Limitations
The research was conducted at a time when the IC Engine for ammonia combustion
was in its advanced stage of development and the trials had not commenced.
Moreover, the risk assessment and feasibility studies by different industry groupings
for different regions of the world on the specific aspect of ammonia bunkering has not
been concluded and the research did not have access to any such inputs.
The intended validation study of the research outcome by way of a workshop with the
participation of subject matter experts could not be materialized due to paucity of time.
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Chapter 5: Results and analysis
The research further progressed using the methodology detailed in the previous chapter
and in the order, a detailed analysis of the results obtained from the qualitative data is
presented in this chapter. The first section of this chapter examines the industrial
accident data and presents the causal factors; whereas, the second section analyses the
qualitative data from the interview of maritime experts.

5.1 Accident data analysis
This research analysed as case-study, a total of ninety-six (96) industrial accidents that
were retrieved as described in section 4.3. The aim was to identify the underlying
causes that resulted in these accidents, which should prove to be useful in identifying
potential risks, that ammonia would pose in its new role as a fuel, in the maritime
decarbonization context. The case study data was limited to the period 2000 – 2021,
with the sole intention of having a data that is not outdated and is relevant. It is
believed that considering the technological advancement in the recent years, a rather
old database will not provide a true assessment on the effectiveness of the safety
barriers employed by other industrial sectors that have been using ammonia for over
hundred years.
The extracted data was organized using worksheets and further classified based on
multiple criteria such as severity of the injury caused to the people in the vicinity; and,
the status of the industrial plant or the concerned equipment at the time of accident.
The cause and effect of the accident was analysed for understanding the root cause of
the accident and its consequence.
5.1.1 Status of the industrial plant at the time of the accident
The analysis of the accidents revealed that a majority (75%) of the accidents had taken
place while the plant was ‘in operation’. Maintenance activities accounted for 23% of
the accidents and 2% of the accidents had occurred during transportation of ammonia.
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Figure 5: Pie chart depicting the number of accidents and status of the ammonia plant at the
time of the accident (N = 96 accidents)

5.1.2 Impact of the accident on the industrial workers
The hazards of ammonia are well known and the exposure thresholds have been
defined, documented by the ILO and most member State and/or the other international
groupings. These have been discussed earlier, in the Chapter 3 of this research. For
the purpose of analysing the severity of the accidents, the data has been classified into
three categories:
(a) very serious,
(b) serious, and
(c) less serious.
An accident which has resulted in at least one fatality has been designated as ‘very
serious accident’.

31

An accident in which at least one person has been seriously injured, requiring
hospitalization and no one had suffered a fatal injury, has been designated as ‘serious
accident’.
An accident in which a person or person(s) suffered minor injury or tolerable exposure
to ammonia vapours which did not require hospitalization has been designated as ‘less
serious accident’.
Figure 6 provides a graphical representation of the number of accidents in each of the
above-mentioned categories.

Figure 6: Classification of ammonia accident data based on the severity of the accident (N =
96 accidents)

The analysis of the accident data revealed that out of the total 96 accident cases, 10
cases of ‘very serious accidents’ had resulted in fatalities to the industrial workers and
this amounted to 10.4% of the total accidents studied for the purpose of this research.
43.7% of the accidents (42 cases) were of ‘serious’ nature and required the affected
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person(s) to be hospitalized. The remainder of the cases were less severe and did not
require hospitalization.
The exposure to ammonia vapour has been found to affect the respiratory tract and
cause severe damage to the eyes and the skin of the person(s) in the vicinity of the
leak.
5.1.3 Accident causal factors
The industrial accident data that was available for this research had limited detail and
were not as elaborate as normally presented consequent to a maritime safety
investigation.

The proximate cause determined by the author is represented as an

infographic in the figure 7.

Figure 7: Infographic showing the proximate causes of industrial accidents (N=96 accidents)

The factor(s) that appeared to be instrumental in the sequence of events, leading to the
accident are broadly classified into three main categories, namely, the human factor,
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the management factor and the technical factor. These are further subdivided into four
themes in each category and are discussed below.
The frequency distribution of the ammonia accidents causes (Nc=187) and the
weighted contribution of each of the factors is at table 7.
I.

Human factor

The accident causation factors attributable to human error have been grouped under
this category and had a contributory role in 33% of the accidents. Frequent causes of
accidents due to the human factor include operator error or incorrect operation
(9.09%), lack of safety awareness (5.88%), deviation from safe working practices
(13.37%) and lack of knowledge, familiarization (5.35%) etc.
Wearing appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) when working within a
plant that uses ammonia, should definitely lower the number of fatal accidents in
most cases. This safety philosophy has to be inculcated so that the personnel are
better prepared and equipped to face any unforeseen leak of ammonia, especially
during maintenance activities which are planned and normally are not an emergency
task.
The data had ammonia leak incidence while undertaking routine work such as
renewal of oil and the researcher therefore, attributes deviation from safe working
practice as one of main causes of industrial accidents within the human factor.
II.

Management factor

The management factor has also been a significant contributor in over 33% of the
accidents. More than 10% of the accidents has been caused on account of an
ineffective preventive maintenance practice.

Failure to adhere to the standard

operating procedures as also lack of it has been attributed as the cause in 11% of the
accident cases.
Lack of a structured training and familiarization programme for personnel working
with the risk of exposure to Ammonia and lack of proper supervision has also been
identified as other contributory sub-factors within the management factor. There
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have been accidents that resulted from rupture of pipelines that carried ammonia due
to the impact of a falling object which indicates negligence and most of the abovementioned contributing factors.
III. Technical factor
The technical factors had contributed to over 33% of the accidents with significant
contributions (20.8%) being attributed to mechanical damage, which in a majority of
the cases were found to be material failure of the tank shell or piping system. The
corrosive action of ammonia which include Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) and its
non-compatibility with certain materials are key accident contributory factors. This
underlines the importance of material selection when using ammonia.
There were accidents caused due to circumferential crack in the stainless-steel tubing
within the compression fitting which was attributed to the metal fatigue along with
vibration and initial metal stress. Absence of protective guard around critical
machines or equipment that contain ammonia has also been identified as a contributor
within this factor.
The failure of the control system which include timely activation of the pressure
relieving devices and alarm monitoring and alerting devices were also identified to
be a factor in 7.49% of the accident causes.
Table 7. Accident causation factors with their weighted contributions, analysed by the author
(N = 96 accidents)
Accident causation factors

Human factor

Deficient safety awareness
Deviation

from

safe

working practices
Lack of knowledge, skill
and familiarization
Incorrect operation

Code

Number of

%

H1

11

5.88

H2

25

13.37

H3

10

5.35

H4

17

9.09

35

Ineffective

preventive

Management factor

maintenance
Ineffective

or

Lack

of

Ineffective

or

lack

of

adequate

training

supervision

and

M1

20

10.70

M2

12

6.42

M3

09

4.81

M4

21

11.23

T1

39

20.86

T2

03

1.60

T3

06

3.21

T4

14

7.49

187

100%

familiarization of staff
Ineffective
adherence

or
to

nonStandard

operating procedures

Mechanical failure
Lack of adequate warning

Technical factor

signs / physical barrier in
potentially

hazardous

areas
Lack of protective guard in
the

vicinity

machines

of
&

critical
auxiliary

equipment’s/fittings
Failure of automation or
control system

T O T A L →
5.2 Qualitative data analysis

As described in section 4.4, the experts for the interviews were chosen from varied
backgrounds and included risk specialists, engine manufacturers, shipping regulators,
flag State representatives, members of Classification societies, etc. The perception and
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experience gathered from these interviews and the existing literature such as the rules
or the guidelines formulated by the Classification societies formed the basis of the
analysis as real shipboard data on ammonia as marine fuel, is not available at this stage.
A total of ten interviews were conducted on the electronic mode, as the interviewees
were from different continents of the world. In most instances, the interviewees were
contacted by email for follow-up questions subsequent to the first interaction, as the
ideas and theories evolved during the interaction with the other experts. The interviews
were recorded and completed in the time range of approximately 40~55 minutes.
5.2.1 Analysis of the interview with experts
The experts that were nominated by the respective organization for the qualitative
interview belonged to a diverse maritime background, as may be seen at table 8:
Table 8. Organizational background of the experts who participated in the interview
Participant

Organization

Ref. No.

represented
Energy major

Hydrocarbon exploration, refining, chemical
manufacturing. Member participant of key
industry coalitions on decarbonization.

International

Instrumental role in the GHG emission
reduction and adoption of alternate fuel in
the maritime sector.

R1

R2

R3

R4

R5

Credential

Shipping Regulator

Flag State

High stake in bunkering and maritime
activities. Active participant and contributor
to the development of guidelines for
ammonia at IMO and other studies.

Flag State

Active member of the CG and key driver of
development of guidelines for ammonia at
the IMO. Conduct of HAZID study and risk
assessment for ammonia fuelled ships.

Classification
Society

Member of the IACS. Active in HAZID
studies, dispersion analysis, Risk
assessment study during ammonia fuelled
engine development and for granting
approval in principle.
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R6

R7

R8

R9

R10

Classification
Society

Classification
Society

Classification
Society

Shipping industry
association

Member of the IACS. Key expertise are
rule development, involved in fuel cell and
carbon capture projects, HAZID and
HAZOP studies, Risk assessment study
during ammonia fuelled engine
development and for granting approval in
principle.
Member of IACS. Developing safety
regulations for ships using gas or low-flash
point fuels such as LNG, LPG, methyl/ethyl
alcohol, and ammonia
Member of IACS. Key expertise are risk
assessment studies during engine
development, port bunkering studies
including dispersion analysis, fuel cell
development, rule development.
Represents the voice of the shipping
industry. Active in development of
guidelines for ammonia fuelled ship at the
IMO.

Development of new engines that can burn
Engine manufacturer ammonia and retrofitting the existing ones,
testing of various methods of treating
ammonia, N2O emissions mitigation trials.

The interviewees were provided with a set of 12 initial questions for the exploratory
interviews (refer Appendix ‘A’). These questions and those that followed during the
in-camera interview were based on the exclusive context of safety and the barriers that
are being currently contemplated by the designers, classification societies, shipowners, flag State(s) etc.
The respondents had expertise in a wide range of aspects, both safety and technical,
that are vital for a safe maritime transportation industry and included:
(a) marine engineers who have years of work experience on merchant ship,
(b) risk specialist with experience in the chemical, oil and gas industry,
(c) experts in the field of Hazard Identification (HAZID) studies,
(d) experienced surveyors involved in formulations of rules and guidelines,
(e) professionals from the maritime law background,
(f) experts who are part of marine engines development and testing,
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(g) members of the IMO’s correspondence group on amendments to the IGF Code
and development of guidelines for low flashpoint fuels.
The interview was transcribed using “otter”, the audio file transcribing tool. The final
data was arrived only after reading and listening to the interview transcripts multiple
times. The transcribed text was, thereafter, corrected as necessary for obtaining the
accurate interpretation of the participating expert’s viewpoint.
According to Philip Burnard (1991) any analysis of interview transcripts, in qualitative
research should aim to create a thorough and systematic record of the themes and
topics raised in the interviews; and connect the themes and interviews using a
relatively comprehensive category system. The challenge in this method was to
compare the utterances of the participants in a reasonable and accurate manner.
After each interview, the researcher read the transcripts and made notes on general
themes that appeared.

In the next stage the themes were grouped into appropriate

headings or categories; and in the process some of the similar headings were collapsed
into a common category.

5.3 Qualitative interview results
The interpretation of the results of the interview was undertaken by examining the data
relevant to each theme and the participating interviewee has been cited using the
unique participant identity code that was referred in table 8. The thematic analysis of
the interview transcripts led to fifteen (15) themes which were later categorised into
five (5) broad categories and are at table 9.
Table 9. Categories and themes extracted from the interview transcripts by the author

Category

Theme

I

Decarbonization
standpoint

1. diesel engine to burn ammonia
2. retrofit option for existing engines
3. bunkering infrastructure

II

Risk and Hazards

4. understanding
the
physical
hazards
5. risk to marine environment
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6. treating ammonia leak
III

Health and Safety of
seafarer

7. exposure threshold
8. safe location of muster station
9. permit to work system

IV

Human factor

10. shipboard operations
11. shipboard maintenance

Regulatory gaps

12. IGC or IGF conundrum
13. lack of standardization
14. pollution preparedness, response
15. STCW convention

V

5.3.1 Decarbonization standpoint
This is the first category referred in the table 9 and comprises three themes which were
related to the development of ‘diesel engine to burn ammonia’, determining the
‘retrofit option for existing engines’ and the readiness of the ‘bunkering infrastructure’
which are detrimental to the uptake of ammonia as a zero-carbon marine fuel.
5.3.1.1 Diesel engine to burn ammonia
Marine diesel engines that can burn ammonia are currently at various stages of
development and trials. Ammonia is not easy to ignite in the engine due to rather high
lower flammability limit (R6). It has a very slow flame propagation with the effect
that it burns rather slowly (R8).

The auto-ignition temperature of ammonia is

approximately 651°C, whereas the corresponding value for diesel oil is 210°C. The
trials of the diesel engine that can use ammonia as fuel are currently ongoing, and the
results are expected to emerge in the year 2023 (R8). Although there are apprehensions
on the Nitrous oxide emissions which has more adverse GHG impact than CO2, engine
makers and other technology suppliers are developing catalyst for removing N2O
emission (R8). The engine makers are trying to keep the N20 emission as ‘low as
possible’ by optimizing engine combustion and the temperatures, so that it not only
arrests the escalation of cost but also reduces the complexity of the design (R10).
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5.3.1.2 Retrofit option for existing diesel engines
The engine makers are into research and development of not only ammonia fuelled
engines but are also exploring the possibility of retrofitting the existing diesel engines
for enabling combustion of ammonia (R10).

The classification societies have

commenced issuance of class notation such as ‘ammonia ready’, ‘ammonia prepared’,
‘fuel ready’ etc. for new built ships, on meeting certain prescribed criteria. Further,
these indicate that a vessel has been designed and constructed in a certain way that
enables retrofitting to ammonia at a later stage (R8). This mandates the fuel tanks,
piping system and the equipment to be designed and fitted in such a way that they can
possibly migrate to newer alternate fuels such as ammonia at a later stage depending
on the availability of the fuel and the cost effectiveness of such an exercise. There are
recent successful examples of LPG tankers undergoing retrofit for enabling use of LPG
as fuel (DNV, 2021b).
5.3.1.3 Bunkering infrastructure
The development of ammonia bunkering in all likelihood should be similar to the
pathway that was followed earlier for LNG and should account the additional layer of
challenge that ammonia presents, due to its toxicity (R1). There are various studies
that are currently underway at major bunkering hubs which includes inter alia risk
assessment and the safe distance from a bunkering location (R8). The impact on the
port and surrounding population if there is an accidental rupture of a pipe or hose
leading to a release of ammonia are also concerns that are being looked into (R8). A
dispersion modelling software is used to analyse the release rate for different scenarios
such as a jet or pool fire so that extent of the leak and toxic cloud can be quantified
(R5).
5.3.2 Risks and hazards
This is the second category which comprises of three themes related to ‘understanding
the physical hazards’, the ‘risk to the marine environment’ and the ways to ‘treating
an ammonia leak’.
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5.3.2.1 Understanding the physical hazards
The hazards associated with anhydrous ammonia have been examined in detail in
chapter 3 of this dissertation. Ammonia is toxic and should be handled with care.
Historically, fatal accidents have occurred due to ammonia leakage. It is, therefore,
important that safety aspects are addressed thoroughly when considering ammonia as
marine fuel (R7). It has to be acknowledged that the risk of toxicity being the physical
property of ammonia can never be eliminated and, therefore, awareness of the hazards
is very important and should never be downplayed (R1).
Corrosivity is the second most significant hazard of ammonia. Ammonia forms a high
pH corrosive solution in contact with water. This corrosive solution may react with
the moisture in the skin, eyes and the respiratory tract to cause burn injury which could
be fatal (R5). Selection of material is another key aspect as some materials, like
copper, nickel, elastomer, some paints etc. are not suitable for an ammonia fuelled ship
(R10). The engine makers are in continuous engagement with additives manufacturers
to identify suitable additives that could be added to the lubricating oil for protecting
the engine parts (R10).
High concentration of ammonia, especially in areas such as the machinery spaces
poses a risk of fire or explosion if ammonia vaporizes rapidly (R7). It is, therefore,
warned that a water jet should never be directed at such accumulation of ammonia
(ILO, 2013). Anhydrous ammonia has a strong affinity for water. A mixture of
gaseous ammonia and water, in an enclosed or partially enclosed space may create a
vacuum which could lead to the containment’s structural collapse (LR, 2021).
In the gaseous state, ammonia is lighter than air and depending on conditions such as
humidity it becomes heavier than air and, this in turn affects the dispersion
characteristics of ammonia vapour (R6). Ammonia, when it is first released will be
denser than air, so the placement of detectors becomes a critical factor and is a design
consideration (R5).
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5.3.2.2 Risk to the marine environment
The risk of ammonia to the marine environment is posed by the discharge of ammonia
to the sea either directly or as a result of the fire water used as a water spray flowing
overboard (R5). The other risk is the pollution of the air on account of venting of
ammonia through the vent mast or exhaust either during normal operation or in an
emergency (R7). The development of ammonia capturing systems, to capture even the
small amounts of ammonia that will be emitted or released during normal operation is
in progress. Currently, there is no unanimity on the degree of venting that should be
permitted and whether it should be limited to the emergency situation only (R8).
The discharge of ammonia into the sea is governed by the provisions of MARPOL
Annex II. However, it was stated (R4) that there is a recognition amongst the members
of the correspondence group regarding a lack of information, such as:
∙ Guidance for dilution or neutralization of ammonia solution;
∙ Capacity of storage or method of recovery for effluents containing ammonia; and,
∙ Toxicity to marine life well.
5.3.2.3 Treating an ammonia leak
The likelihood and consequences of fuel releases are to be minimised by ventilation,
detection and safety actions. These safeguards can seem innocuous; however, their
reliability is critical to reduce the risk to at least a tolerable level (R5).
Methods to treat ammonia in the event of a release are scrubbers, vent stacks
(inherently safer if dispersion can be achieved), and thermal oxidation (e.g., flares,
incinerators) (R5).
5.3.3 Health and safety of seafarer
This is the third category referred in table 9 and comprises of three themes which were
related to the ‘exposure threshold’, the ‘safe location of muster station’ and the
prospective changes to ‘the permit to work system’.
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5.3.3.1 Exposure threshold
The requirements specified in the safety data sheet are different in different parts of
the world (R5) and the variations have been explained in section 3.3.2 of this
dissertation. Toxicity and corrosivity of ammonia have led to fatal industrial accidents
and, therefore, it is important that safety aspects should be addressed thoroughly when
considering ammonia as a marine fuel (R7).
Multiple barriers will have to be in place, whether it is from technological perspective
or from a health, safety and environment (HSE) perspective for protection of the
seafarers (R1). In normal circumstances, the target is to have ammonia concentration
much below the odour threshold; and at all the places where the personnel are expected
to be present without any personal protective equipment, the concentration should be
below 30 ppm (R10). There will have to be a wide and detailed knowledge of the
safety precautions before the world starts using ammonia as a fuel (R10). The
exposure to ammonia may have direct and very quick consequences on humans which
is not acceptable and, therefore, in the interest of standardization, it is expected that
the IMO should be able to issue guidelines by the end of 2023 (R6)
In the meantime, (R5) indicated that it would be helpful if some industry body could
bring the various parties together and reach a consensus on these threshold numbers
and believed that it would prove helpful to a lot of people including equipment
manufacturers and others. Further, on the impact of these threshold limits on the
management of different scenarios onboard, (R5) elaborated:
“There may also be an impact on how one manages the systems in different
scenarios. For e.g., in a scenario of abandonment of the vessel in the event of
catastrophic ammonia failure, based on the exposure threshold limit
determined, there may be other additional requirement for the emergency
breathing apparatus or similar protection, for boarding lifeboats.” (R5)
5.3.3.2 Safe location of muster station
To secure an evacuation route in emergency, it is necessary to determine the diffusion
behaviour of ammonia and the requirements for arrangement/ design of vent post for
which there is insufficient information at this stage (R4). The location of a muster

44

point becomes important in a scenario where there is a catastrophic leak of ammonia
and the crew need to safely muster before considering abandonment of the vessel, if
so required (R5). This location has to be defined considering all aspects of crew safety
when developing the guidelines on ammonia.
5.3.3.3 Permit to work system
The risk associated with the fuel is completely different from what the crew is currently
accustomed with and, therefore, the permit to work system would have to evolve after
guidelines are issued by IMO (R9).
In recognition of the risks from potential release of toxic ammonia from pressure relief
valves, hazardous space ventilation exits, bunker stations and other potential release
sources protected by drip trays, certain areas are to be considered as toxic areas and
are required to be located at minimum distances as prescribed in the class rules, from
the nearest air intake, outlet or opening to accommodation spaces, service spaces and
control stations or other non-hazardous areas (ABS, 2021).
With the experience of having undertaken engine development and trials, (R10)
believed that:
“For ammonia you will always have handheld sniffer systems before you start
to open, for e.g., crankcase doors, exhaust pipes etc. Here we are learning all
the time on how to do it in a safe way. Own personal protection equipment and
detection system plus good instruction on how to work, what to be inerted, what
to be emptied and so on. It will take some time to learn.” (R10)
5.3.4 Human factor
This is the fourth category which comprises of two themes which were related to the
‘shipboard operations’ and the ‘shipboard maintenance’.
5.3.4.1 Shipboard operations
Fuel handling and the entire engine room layout are key challenges onboard a ship that
would use ammonia as fuel. Eventually, it is reasonable to expect that there would be
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some leaks during operation and the challenge is to design the right system that is
capable to handle those leaks (R1).
Any single failure in the fuel piping system should not release the toxic ammonia in
the machinery space (R7). This has been the philosophy that has been adopted earlier
for LNG as fuel in the IGF Code. The fuel pipes are, therefore, required to be of double
wall design and outer pipe or duct is to be continuous to prevent any gas being
discharged even when the inner pipe has a leak (Korean Register, 2021). Automatic
ammonia gas detection at the ppm level and automatic response such as alarm,
increased ventilation, and line shutdown are technologies that can enable safe
operation of ammonia handling systems (R7).
As the studies are still being undertaken, there is a thought whether the double wall
piping is required everywhere in the machinery space or whether it should include
spaces such as the fuel preparation room, gas valve unit spaces and the tank connection
spaces, where the personnel do not enter during normal operation (R6). There are also
alternate concepts being debated such as running fuel pipes in a gastight duct which
provide equivalent protection and on how far it should extend (R5).
The toxicity of ammonia provides no allowance for any leak to be permitted, however
small the quantity may be and, therefore, instead of the “ESD protected machinery
spaces” concept “gas safe machinery space” concept is selected for an ammonia
fuelled ship (R4, R7).
The fuel handling system, lube system should look very different on an engine using
ammonia as fuel. Ammonia comes with a lot of intricacies, and it is important for the
crew to understand why systems, processes and interlocks are in place, so that they can
use them properly when working onboard (R1). The perceived changes in the safety
habits of a seafarer as expressed by the expert during the interview, can be summarized
as:
“The natural response of a seafarer today is to rush to the engine room when
there is a leak or an alarm to find out and sort it out but, with ammonia the
first thing one needs to do is exit the engine room, ventilate, shutdown and only
then to go and attend to the problem.” (R1)

46

The use of water curtain as a safety barrier against ammonia leak at spaces like the
bunker manifold, needs to be handled carefully as the water falling on a refrigerated
ammonia pool can have disastrous effects. The vaporisation can turn worse due to the
heat transfer to the pool which negates the very purpose for which the water spray
system was fitted (R5). The risk of toxicity shall require the crew designated for
bunkering operation to wear breathing apparatus (R6).
The human factor is also being looked into in the various HAZID studies that are being
undertaken and a safety critical task analysis also would be required to be done at a
later stage (R5).
5.3.4.2 Shipboard maintenance
As revealed by interviewee (R10), during maintenance, even after inerting, the odour
of ammonia would be experienced as it is the result of the ammonia mixed in the
lubricating oil. This is dependent on the oil temperature and was described by the
expert:
“When the engine is running and the oil is warm, the ammonia in the oil will
evaporate. If the oil is cold, there is a possibility of the presence of ammonia
in it, especially if the engine has been running.” (R10)
The awareness of the hazards is very important and should not be downplayed and
therefore the expert (R1) believes that the seafarers who are working onboard need to
have a very good understanding of the fuel handling complexities, and other
procedures prior responding to leaks and alarms. Further, it was stated that:
“Regular maintenance practices like scavenge cleaning will be a safety
challenge as there will be ammonia mixed with the lubricants in these spaces.
Even taking a sample of lubricating oil may prove to be a challenge.” (R1)
Safety during maintenance is also one of the aspects being examined in the risk
assessment studies that are currently being undertaken (R5) and it was emphasized
that:
“Perhaps something needs to be learnt from the tanker experience of handling
ammonia as cargo, especially the approach towards maintenance activities.”
(R5)
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The use of compatible materials, appropriate PPE which should include the sniffer
system and handheld systems are mandatory before considering opening of the
crankcase door, exhaust pipe etc. and should form part of important safety procedures
to be followed on an ammonia fuelled ship (R10).
5.3.5 Regulatory gaps
This is the fifth category which comprises of four themes which were related to ‘IGC
or IGF conundrum’ that exists during the design of a vessel, ‘lack of standardization’
especially with respect to the safety data and the exposure thresholds, ‘pollution,
preparedness, response’, and the ‘STCW’ convention.
5.3.5.1 IGC or IGF conundrum
The IGC Code regulation 16.9.2 prohibits use of a toxic gas like ammonia as a marine
fuel. The safety regulations to be considered when applying the IGF Code for an
alternate gaseous fuel like ammonia, are not clear (R7) in the current scenario, any
ammonia fuelled vessel in the next few years will need to go through the alternative
design approach (R8). Ammonia is currently not part of the IGF Code and the
discussions taking place at the IMO is summarized by the author at table 10.
Table 10. Summary of key discussions at the IMO on the amendments to the IGF Code and
development of guidelines for the use of ammonia as a marine fuel.
Symbol and Title
CCC 7/INF.8: Forecasting
the alternative marine fuel:
ammonia
CCC 7/3/9: Amendments
to the IGF Code and
development of guidelines
for low flashpoint fuels

Originator

Summary

Republic of

Introduced the outline of the outlook

Korea

of ammonia as green ship fuel.

European

Proposed

Commission

development

inclusion
of

two

of

the

separate

and 28

guidelines for the safety of ships

member

using ammonia and hydrogen as

States

fuel.
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MSC 104/15/9:
Development of nonmandatory guidelines for
safety of ships using
ammonia as fuel

Japan,

Proposed a new output to develop

Singapore,

non-mandatory guidelines for the

ICS and

safety of ships using ammonia as

INTERCARGO

MSC 104/15/10: Hazard
Identification of ships

Presented result of the HAZID study

Japan

of ships using ammonia as fuel.

using ammonia as fuel

Proposal

MSC 104/15/30:

to

deliberate

on

operational safety measures and on

Necessity of deliberations
on operational safety

fuel

the

Japan

effectiveness

and

negative

impact of fire safety measures, in

measures and fire safety

particular those for limitation of

measures

explosion consequences

MSC 105/2/2: The
development of safety

Presents preliminary views on the

requirements at the

risks associated with the options

needed pace and detail to

IACS

currently researched and trialled

support the achievement

including ammonia to deliver a safe

of the decarbonization

zero-CO2-emitting ship.

goal
The committee agreed to include in
the biennial agenda of the CCC for

MSC 105/20: Report of
the Maritime Safety
Committee on its 105th

2022-23 & provisional agenda for

IMO
Secretariat

Session

CCC 8 an output on “Development of
guidelines for the safety of ships
using ammonia as fuel” with a target
completion year of 2023.

CCC 8/2/1: The
development of safety

Presents a discussion on the risks

IACS

associated with ammonia and the
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requirements for alternate

areas of regulatory development.

fuels and technologies at

Emphasizes on the need to set up an

the needed pace and

overarching Committee considering

detail to support the

the

achievement of the IMO’s

development of safety requirements

decarbonization goals

to support the decarbonization goal.

CCC 8/INF.10:

Presents a summary of comments

Development of guidelines
for the safety of ships

in

the

Group (safety information for the use
of ammonia)

CCC 8/13: Development

of ships using ammonia

involved

provided to the Correspondence

Japan

using ammonia as fuel

of guidelines for the safety

complexity

Presents a discussion on collection
Japan

of information on the safe use of
ammonia.

as fuel

Provides information on possible
CCC 8/13/1: Development

Japan,

of guidelines for the safety

Singapore,

developing guidelines for the safety

ICS and

of ships using ammonia as fuel

of ships using ammonia
as fuel

issues

INTERCARGO

to

including

be

considered

establishing a CG

for

to

prepare draft guidelines.
CCC 8/13/2: Development
of guidelines for the safety
of ships using ammonia

Republic of
Korea

Proposes

a

environmental

review
effect

of
for

the
future

discussions.

as fuel

The IGC Code provides a good basis to start with and it is known that certain aspects
such as the effect of toxicity, material selection against the corrosivity of ammonia,
etc. will need further consideration within the framework of the IGC Code (R3). The
IGC Code, therefore, offers a relatively easy way to incorporate concerns pertaining
to the use of ammonia.
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There was also an opinion that the basic requirements can be referenced to the IGF
Code. The main purpose of the IGF Code is to provide countermeasures against fire
and explosion of combustible fuels and, therefore, it needs to develop and consider
countermeasures for toxicity of ammonia (R4).
5.3.5.2 Lack of standardization
The IMO and the IACS are yet to develop any universal guidelines for use of ammonia
as a marine fuel. At this point of time there is no consensus between classification
societies or any port or flag authorities. It will be necessary to have a general agreement
on safety measures which can be applied to ammonia fuelled ships (R6).
Currently, even for the aspect of toxicity there are different points of view coming
from different sources (R10). The workplace exposure limits for short term or long
term, and the training of the seafarers do not have a common standard at this point of
time (R3). Also, for the personal protective equipment for the crew onboard a ship,
the industry seemingly is not ready to agree on a common standard yet (R5). While it
is unanimously stated by almost all the interviewees that there are lessons to be learnt
from the way the shipping industry has been handling ammonia as cargo it has to be
acknowledged that the tanker ships are subjected to additional inspections by oil
majors such as vetting and/or Tanker Management Self-Assessment (TMSA1) audits.
The non-tanker ships such as bulk carriers and container ships that will be using
ammonia as fuel would need to have these kinds of systems to promote safety (R5).
The concentration of ammonia within the double wall piping is a critical parameter
since it is the first place where a leak can be identified by the detectors. There is,
however, a difference in this threshold value published by different Classification
societies. Although the engine makers are very eager to have some kind of unified

1

Tanker Management and Self-Assessment (TMSA) is a guideline to measure and assess tanker

operators’ management system developed by Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF).
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approach, one of the reasons for the different approaches is that the manufacturers are
all still learning and trying to figure out what is the best one. (R8)
5.3.5.3 Pollution, preparedness and response
The physical properties of ammonia are different from that of fuel oil. Ammonia is a
gaseous fuel that will dissolve in water and cause damage to the marine environment,
and therefore needs a different treatment (R2). Ammonia when discharged to the
atmosphere poses risk to the human body and is another source of air pollution (R7).
Recognising the long experience that the shipping industry has in operating ammonia
carriers it is believed that the risks associated with ammonia can be controlled by
having trained and competent crew compared to other sectors.

However, it is

necessary to consider the newer risks which include consideration of the fact that the
ammonia gas carriers have been used only on specific routes and ports, whereas the
ammonia fuelled ships will be operating in a much wider range of ports and routes.
Therefore, additional safety measures need to be researched and developed. (R4)
The response to any emergency including responding to any technical failure onboard
a ship, whether from the ship or from the shore will need some upskilling (R1). The
capabilities for emergency preparedness and response exists in the ports that have been
handling ammonia as cargo, but a rise in the number of ships would merit a scaling up
of resources (R3).
There is a concern on the use of water curtain to deal with an ammonia leak and is
explained by the expert (R5) as:
“If we try to deal ammonia leak with a water system, then you need to consider
how to handle the effluent. The ammonium hydroxide will be caustic and
whether spill off the side of the vessel is permissible. Need a containment
system for the fire water run off or something of that sort.” (R5)
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5.3.5.4 Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
seafarers
Seafarers would require additional knowledge on the ability to handle leaks during
transfer, storage, handling and maintenance of equipment, emergency response
scenarios and related equipment (R1).
Acknowledging the significance of the seafarers who would operate the ships that
would use ammonia as fuel, the expert (R3) stated:
“Seafarer of the future might be quite different from the seafarer of the past,
in terms of what they have to deal with, whether it is the safety, environment
protection or the technological aspects. In consideration of the upcoming
alternate fuel, it is acknowledged that the seafarers are not equipped in terms
of the standards and it is something the IMO is going to consider while they
are in the process of reviewing the STCW convention. The IMO definitely
needs to come up with model courses for ammonia and other alternate fuel
options.” (R3)

5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the collected data in different ways which included tabular
and graphical representations. The themes identified from the qualitative interview,
grouped into five different categories were elucidated in this chapter and shall be used
to discuss the research question and obtain meaningful answer to the research
questions in the concluding chapter.
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Chapter 6: Discussion and conclusion
This chapter discusses the interpretation of the results of the qualitative data and
provides an assessment on how successful it has been in finding answers to the
research questions. The chapter ends with a conclusion that synthesizes the findings
of this research.
6.1

Discussion

This research was undertaken to seek answers to the two pertinent research questions,
concerning the safety aspects of ships that would use ammonia as a marine fuel in the
maritime decarbonization scenario. During the process of this research, the accident
data from the industrial accident databases were analysed and interview with experts
from the field of maritime decarbonization were conducted to seek the answers to the
research questions.
6.1.1 Causal factors of potential accidents on an ammonia fuelled ships
The research question 1 of this dissertation related to finding the causal factors of
potential shipboard accidents when using ammonia as a marine fuel.
A ship has a different work ecosystem when compared to any shore-based industry.
The seafarers who work on the modern ships are adequately trained and certified for
their role designated onboard a ship. These are more stringent on a tanker ship to fulfil
the additional requirements of the oil major, charterer etc. However, accidents occur
on ships at regular intervals even with all the technological advancements and
enhanced management of safety.
Ammonia has been carried as cargo on ships for decades and has an enviable safety
record. But the ships that would use ammonia as fuel will have the toxic ammonia
leading into the machinery space and the fuel tank space which can be close to the
living quarters depending on the design of the ship, size etc. The potential causal
factors of accidents onboard a ship using ammonia as fuel, derived from the study of
industrial accidents and from the qualitative interview of experts is synthesised in the
form of fishbone diagram at figure 8.
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Each of the six identified overarching causes of a potential accident onboard a ship is
further divided into several contributory factors that are linked to each of the six bones
of the fishbone diagram. The causal factors that lead to a shipboard accident on a ship
that use ammonia as fuel is further described in detail by discussing each of the key
factors.
1. Operational error
The human element in any shipboard accident can be a result of fatigue, lack
of safety awareness, deviation from standard operating procedures (SOP)
which individually or collectively can cause roll over during bunkering of
ammonia. Any leak or dripping of ammonia can lead to formation of a toxic
cloud with a rapid impact on the health of the persons in the vicinity.
Therefore, the significance of wearing the appropriate PPE cannot be
emphasised further.
2. Maintenance error
Periodic maintenance is a vital cog in the wheel for a trouble-free operation of
any ship. Every maintenance needs to be undertaken as per the maker’s
instruction and the safety procedures established by the company’s safety
management system, which is a requirement of the International Safety
Management (ISM) code. Any deviation from these, coupled with the use of
spurious and incompatible materials would prove to be disastrous for a ship
using ammonia as fuel.

The corrosivity of ammonia which have been

discussed in the preceding chapters, is a cause for pre-mature failure in certain
materials, resulting in sudden release of toxic Ammonia.
The accident data has highlighted how accidents have occurred while draining
and refilling the lubricant from a compressor and the same has been explained
in section 5.1.3 and section 5.3.4.1. Onboard a ship, this risk shall have to be
mitigated while undertaking activities such as crankcase inspection, scavenge
cleaning and inspection etc. for the same reason (R1, R10).

Effective

supervision and adhering to the prescribed safety procedures during
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maintenance are, therefore, very significant and need to be emphasized in the
safety management system onboard such ships (R1).

3. Fuel containment and storage failure
The fuel storage system is designed to withstand the pressure within the tanks
depending on the type of tank and method adopted to have the pressure within
the pressure relief valve (PRV) set point. Moreover, the ships with
reliquefication system should have a back-up arrangement so that the tank
pressure is maintained within the PRV limit at all times (R8). However, any
unforeseen emergency situation such as a fire, collision or grounding can lead
to the inoperability of the reliquefication unit and, therefore, an increase in
pressure inside the fuel storage tanks.
The corrosive action of ammonia may lead to a rupture or failure of the tank
structure if not captured during the maintenance process. Selection of material
at the design stage and thereafter is important for example, steel such as 9%
Nickel steel which is suitable for LNG cannot be used for ammonia because of
corrosiveness (R8).
4. Instrumentation or automation failure
The industrial accident analysis has had many instances where the pressure
relief valves or the pressure transmitters had failed to activate or had error in
their operation.

In order to ensure reliability of safety-critical systems,

numerous in-depth reliability analysis must be carried out, particularly during
the design stage (Rausand, 2014) and in the shipping context it is key to
ensuring safety of personnel and prevention of damage to the environment.
5. Leak due to rupture of piping or the connectors
Ammonia, by its physical property, is highly reactive and incompatible with a
number of materials. The industrial accidents had a number of cases wherein
the connectors or the adaptor nipple fitted were acknowledged to be the
weakest link leading to the ammonia leak. Several accidents were a result of a
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rupture of a pipe containing ammonia due to the impact of a falling object that
was being lifted or shifted within the machinery space.
The double wall ammonia pipelines in the machinery space, which is a
protective measure required as per the IGF code, however, does not insulate
such accidents from occurring on a ship. The safety management system
onboard should be reviewed to have essential safeguards in place for such
potential accidents.

Although the design of modern ships that will use

ammonia as marine fuel have a nearly uniform specification amongst the
classification societies regarding minimum distance of about 800 mm from the
ship side, breach of the ship’s hull on account of a collision or grounding may
cause damage to the pipelines depending on the extent of the damage and
cannot be ignored.
Ships have different operational conditions (R4). There are both internal and
external factors that can induce vibration. The vibration if unattended or timely
remedied can lead to a shearing of the pipes or fittings which may cause release
of ammonia as seen in the industrial accident data referred in section 5.1.3.
6. Miscellaneous contributing factors
The release of toxic ammonia can have a rapid impact on the personnel
working in the vicinity especially, if the cause was not anticipated. Moreover,
a leak of ammonia, for example, within the confines of an engine room may
cause the ammonia to absorb the moisture making it denser than air. This
combined with an ignition source can cause a fire or even an explosion.
The location of a muster station for the crew to safely assemble in the event of
an emergency due to leak of ammonia is something that has to be well thought
off, as it is dependent on various factors such as wind direction, temperature
and the dispersion analysis result for the specific ship. The master of the ship
has to be conversant about these factors while co-ordinating any evacuation
operation both, within and with the shore. Most common ship accident causes
such as collision, grounding, steering and propulsion failure shall continue to
be a concern despite all the safeguards on account of the physical properties of
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ammonia and its effects on the humans.

Any accident that becomes

uncontrolled needs shore intervention and since ammonia has unique
properties such as toxicity and corrosivity, the response unit ashore also needs
to be suitably equipped and trained. Else, the rescue, relief and pollution
prevention efforts will not be purposeful with a likelihood of casualty on the
shore side as well and this may prove to be a deterrence.

6.1.2 Discussion on the control measures and safety barriers
The research question 2 of this dissertation related to establishing the control
measures and safety barriers that would ensure safe operation and protection of
marine environment when ships use ammonia as a marine fuel.
The best way to avoid any accidents is to prevent them from happening by creating
safety barriers against the identified threats. The physical properties of ammonia as
detailed in chapter 3 of this dissertation and the study of accidents in the other
industrial sector has identified the ‘toxicity’ of ammonia as the most significant
contributor to any accident.
As highlighted in section 3.3.2 and section 5.1.2 of this dissertation, ammonia’s
property of corrosivity is also a concern, as the exposure affects the human eye, skin
and the respiratory tract leading to very serious casualties, which can be fatal at times.
The underlying significance is, therefore, to prevent any leakage from happening in
the first place.
The deployment of effective safety barriers and control measures against the identified
risks would define the trajectory of ammonia as a marine fuel. The measures that have
emerged from this research are as follows:
1. Prevention of leakage
The design of an ammonia fuelled ship should be based on the philosophy of
zero leak with secondary containment for the tanks and double wall protection
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for the piping. Regular inspection and monitoring shall provide pre-warning of
any imminent breakdown.
2. Effective detection of leakage
The selection of appropriate sensors and detectors together with their location
is key to detect any leakage of ammonia. The double wall annular space should
be fitted with leak detection system for an early detection of any damage to the
inner piping. Handheld detection system capable of detecting ammonia should
be mandatorily available in sufficient numbers for use of the personnel working
onboard a ship.
3. Treatment of ammonia leakage
There are various methods to treat ammonia if a leak is detected namely
scrubbers, vent stacks and thermal oxidation (e.g., flares, incinerators) (R5).
There is however lack of guidelines on the degree of dilution or neutralization
of the ammonia solution (R4); and the capacity of the containment system that
may be required on the ships for collection of the effluent generated as a result
of the deluge system or water curtain used to deal with an ammonia leak (R5).
Remote isolation of fuel systems for isolation in the event of a leak should also
be mandated and periodically tested.
4. Development of ammonia capturing system
The development of an ammonia capturing system in the future, should ensure
successful capture of even the small amounts of ammonia that will be emitted
or released in normal operation.
5. Transformational changes in the work procedure
The maintenance activities should be undertaken with strict adherence to the
standard operating procedures to limit the toxic exposure to ammonia.
Activities such as opening of the crankcase door, exhaust pipes, cleaning of
filters etc. should be handled with extreme caution and appropriate personal
protective equipment should be worn. Risk assessment should be performed
prior undertaking such tasks and it should be approved by the competent
person.
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6. Selection of material
According to the chapter 17.12 of the IGC Code “Anhydrous ammonia may
cause stress corrosion cracking in containment and process systems made of
carbon-manganese steel or nickel steel.” The IGC Code further requires
constructional and operational measures such as limiting the water and
dissolved oxygen content in the tanks and the piping, so that the risk of stress
corrosion cracking is minimized.
7. Emergency preparedness
The toxic nature of the ammonia would require a dispersion analysis to be
done, to ascertain the most appropriate location for the crew to safely muster
in the event of any leakage of ammonia. The personal protection equipment
should include an appropriate suit that provides adequate protection to the skin,
face and the feet. In the event of any evacuation, the crew should mandatorily
don the breathing apparatus with a respirator that is suitable for the purpose.
In a deviation from the other alarms, any ammonia leak alarm should cause the
personnel to immediately vacate the place and muster as instructed. The shore
rescue teams also need to be equipped to deal with the varied threat posed by
ammonia fuelled ships, as currently such preparedness measures are limited to
a few ports that handle ammonia as cargo.
8. Developing standards, guidelines and amendments to the instruments
At this stage the ship designers, engine makers, classification societies and
other stake holders are deliberating various hazards, identifying the risks and
analysing the best method to mitigate them. Safety construction and safety
management aspects which need to be considered for harmonization of the
standards should include the following as a minimum:
(a)

the protective location of the containment system and pipelines;

(b)

the design criteria for a fuel tank and minimum time a refrigerated storage
tank should withstand the pressure within without causing a relief and
release;
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(c)

location, type and minimum number of detectors and sensors that would be
required;

(d)

type of sub-division and insulation;

(e)

extent of the double-wall piping system;

(f)

fire-fighting system;

(g)

ventilation type, capacity, suitable location of the vent mast, permissible
concentration of Ammonia that can be vented;

(h)

standard procedure for sampling of fuel;

(i)

limit of NOx, N2O and ammonia emission;

(j)

defining toxicity threshold for the workplace;

(k)

improved standard for monitoring the health of seafarer;

(l)

developing guidelines and approving technology that will be required to
contain, treat and discharge the effluent resulting from the fire wash water
used as a water spray; and

(m) definition of toxic zones similar to the hazardous zones on tanker ships in
consideration of the trade-off between toxicity and flammability.
The casual factors which were described in section 6.1.1 and the safety barriers
described in the section 6.1.2 are key to ensuring safety of the ship, the seafarers,
protection of the marine environment and avoidance of any damage to the adjoining
areas, considering the toxic effects of ammonia. The cause to consequence correlation
is demonstrated as a bow-tie diagram at figure 9.
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High quality barrier

Medium quality barrier

Figure 9: A Bow-tie diagram illustrating the desirable safety barriers against the potential threats on an ammonia fuelled ship
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Escalation factor

6.2 Conclusion
In pursuit of a suitable replacement for the fossil fuels, there are a number of alternate
fuel candidates with no clear winner or loser emerging at this stage. Ammonia has
been safely and efficiently transported on ships for the last many decades; and has been
used in the fertilizer and other agriculture-based industries for over a century. There
is very little unknown about ammonia and that is a huge fillip for ammonia’s take-off
as a potential marine fuel.
This research had been fairly successful in meeting the research objectives set in
section 1.3 of chapter 1. The hazards posed by ammonia in its new manifestation as a
marine fuel has been elucidated in this chapter, incorporating the lessons learnt from
the industrial accidents and the valuable inputs received from interview with experts.
The current standards that are being followed in the design and construction of ships
that would use ammonia as fuel are based on the alternate design principle wherein the
flag State together with the Recognised Organisation (RO) prescribes the rules for
design, construction and trial, recognizing all the hazards based on the risk assessment
and HAZID studies undertaken.
There are no uniform international standards that exist today as ammonia was not until
recently, a serious alternate fuel option. The material safety data sheet (MSDS) that is
currently being used for maritime transportation of ammonia across different regions
of the world needs to be standardized with detailed data, including permissible
concentration of ammonia for the benefit of the engine and other equipment makers,
and the end-user. Currently, the engine that can burn ammonia as fuel is under
development and the industry is awaiting results of the initial engine trial to see the
level of success that could be achieved in the combustion of ammonia in an IC engine.
The abatement technology for nitrogen oxide (NOx) which include the selective
catalytic reduction (SCR) system is in existence and being used on many ships, but the
main apprehension is regarding the nitrous oxide N2O emission which is a greenhouse
gas that is much bigger concern than CO2.
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The research could capture a sentiment from the shipping industry wherein the industry
is viewing the developments with caution and restrained in their action, to ensure that
their investments are not stranded. The industry’s apprehension is understood to have
been based on their earlier experience with non-universal acceptance of alternative
technology such as the exhaust gas cleaning system. The reason is the realization at a
later stage that geographically in certain areas around the world a particular option
cannot be used owing to issues that were identified after the investment was made.
The industry is, therefore, eagerly awaiting the lifecycle analysis of ammonia before
making the first move. There are, however, many ships that are being ordered on the
dual fuel concept wherein the classification society has issued them a notation denoting
their level of readiness in adapting to a new alternate fuel as it becomes available later.
These are basically limited to the construction of fuel tanks, fuel piping system, etc.
The classification societies have developed their own rules for the design and
construction of ships with periodic review and amendments as the results of the risk
assessments and the engine development, emerge and evolve. The sub-committee on
carriage of cargoes and containers (CCC) at its seventh session in September 2021 had
tasked the correspondence group that was working on amendments to the IGF code
and development of guidelines for low-flashpoint fuels, to ‘collect information on the
safety of ships using ammonia as fuel.’ The information collected together with the
HAZID study undertaken by Japan shall be presented before the CCC at the eight
session which is scheduled during September 14-23, 2022. CCC-8 is also likely to
establish a correspondence group to prepare the draft guidelines which could then be
expected to be finalized at the subsequent meeting of the CCC.
The concerns for the shipping industry are the availability of ammonia, development
of engines to burn ammonia as fuel and establishing a safety shield against the known
hazards of ammonia. It is very vital to the acceptance of ammonia as a marine fuel,
that the first movers have a smooth transition without encountering any unmitigated
risk and challenges. This has been highlighted by almost all of the experts who were
interviewed for this dissertation, as it is feared that a serious accident with threat to
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life, property and the environment shall influence and drive the public perception in a
manner similar to the negative impact it has earlier created in the use of nuclear energy.
The development of Ammonia as a fuel will also need further training of the seafarers
who would be operating these ships.
The international bodies such as the IMO, ILO, WHO and the ISO have to develop
uniform standards and regulations for ensuring safety of shipboard operations keeping
in mind the safety, health of the seafarers and the other stake holders so that the uptake
of ammonia as a marine fuel receives no set back in the ships that would be early
movers.
Ammonia which scores with its low global warming potential (GWP) and ozone
depletion potential (ODP) is one of the better candidates to become an alternative to
the fossil fuels. In the future, with the development of safety regulations and its
adaptation, ammonia could not only be transitional but a transformational alternative
to fossil fuel.
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Appendices
Appendix ‘A’

Initial Questions for exploratory interviews
My name is Praveen Raghavan Nair, an ex-chief engineer who is currently working
with the Directorate General of Shipping, Mumbai (Maritime Administration of India).
In partial fulfilment of my Masters programme at the World Maritime University
(WMU) at Malmo, Sweden, I am undertaking research on the safety analysis of
potential risks onboard ships that would use ammonia as marine fuel. As part of the
interview with industry experts, seafarers and stakeholders, I intend to get answers for
questions related to the risks and safety barriers arising from the application of
ammonia as a marine fuel. Few of the key question are as listed below and based on
the discussion, the interviewer may pose further questions for purposeful research on
the topic mentioned above.
Details of the participant
Name

Current Organization

Designation

Qualification & Training
Experience

Areas of Expertise

in

shipping

industry (Years)

If the participant is a seafarer, the following additional details may also be
provided:
Grade of Certificate
of

Competency

Type of Ships sailed

held
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Highest

rank

attained

on

Have you sailed on ships
carrying LPG, LNG, or
Ammonia as cargo? If yes,

merchant ships

please specify.

Introductory (sample) questions
1. Could you briefly describe your association (both, current and past) with any
maritime decarbonization projects. What is the current status of these projects?
2. In the context of ammonia being one of the alternate fuel candidates for the
shipping industry in its search for a zero-carbon fuel, could you please share
your views about ongoing projects globally that are being undertaken with
ammonia as fuel?
3. On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate the degree of risk associated with
ammonia as marine fuel? Could you please justify the rating.
4. In the background of your association with the decarbonisation projects, could
you please share the outcome of safety assessment undertaken on the use of
ammonia as a marine fuel?
5. In your view, to what extent does the ‘The International Code of Safety for
ships using gases or other low-flashpoint fuels’ (IGF Code) address the risks
associated with the ships that use ammonia as fuel?
6. As the IMO’s mandatory regulatory criteria are still in the evolving stage, could
you please describe the safety benchmarking adopted by the industry in the
design and construction of ships with ammonia as fuel?
7. In your opinion, what are the specific role(s) played by the flag State and the
Recognised Organization (RO) to ensure safe design, construction and
operation of ships that are being built on the alternate fuel platform such as
ammonia, until adoption of a common regulatory standard by the IMO?
8. In your view, what are the distinctive features of the rules that have been
framed by the major classification societies viz. LR, ABS, KRS, NKK, BV etc.
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for use of ammonia as marine fuel and are they addressing the identified risks?
Are there any aspects that distinguishes these rules from each other?
9.

Could you share your opinion on how the shipping industry can mitigate the
risks associated with the use of ammonia as a fuel, during operation and
maintenance; and whether the existing safety management systems would be
adequate to meet the additional challenges?

10. What are the risks and complexities involved in the supply of ammonia as
bunker fuel to ships? Could you share your insights on the level of
preparedness by the bunker suppliers worldwide, in supplying ammonia to
ships as bunker and the steps being undertaken to mitigate the attendant
risks?
11. In your opinion what additional skills, competencies and expertise would be
required for a seafarer serving on a ship, or a bunker supplying company’s
personnel to mitigate these risks? What would be the additional training needs
for these personnel?
12. What is your opinion on uptake of ammonia as a marine fuel in the mid-term
and long term? What would be the likely costs to the industry in terms of
additional risk mitigation measures?
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